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Abstract
In this paper a new use case for legal argumentation support tools is considered: 
supporting discussions about analyses of complex criminal cases with the help of 
Bayesian probability theory. By way of a case study, two actual discussions between 
experts in court cases are analysed on their argumentation structure. In this study 
the usefulness of several recognised argument schemes is confirmed, a new argu-
ment scheme for arguments from statistics are proposed, and an analysis is given of 
debates between experts about the validity of their arguments. From a practical point 
of view the case study yields insights into the design of support software for discus-
sions about Bayesian analyses of complex criminal cases.
Keywords Argument schemes · Reasoning about evidence · Probability · 
Argumentation support
1 Introduction
There is an ongoing debate on models of rational evidential reasoning in criminal 
cases. Both argumentation-based, story-based and Bayesian approaches have been 
proposed (Pardo and Allen 2008; Kaptein et al. 2009; Fenton and Berger 2016; Ver-
heij et al. 2016). In this paper1 I remain neutral with respect to this debate. Instead 
I want to argue that even if Bayesian thinking is adopted as the overall model of 
legal evidential reasoning, there is still one aspect of this form of reasoning that is 
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clearly argumentative in nature, namely, debates about a proposed Bayesian analysis 
of a case or some aspects of it. This observation is theoretically interesting but also 
has practical implications for support systems for legal proof and crime investiga-
tion. Forensic experts increasingly use Bayesian probability theory as their theoreti-
cal framework and they increasingly use software tools for designing Bayesian net-
works. In crime investigation or in court the need may arise to record the pros and 
cons of the various design decisions embodied in these analyses and argumentation 
support technology may be of use here. This holds both for Bayesian analyses of 
specific aspects of a case (such as assessments of the evidential value of a piece of 
evidence) and for more general uses of Bayesian probability theory to say something 
about the probability of guilt given the available evidence.
In AI & Law and related fields various argumentation support systems have been 
proposed; cf. e.g. Van den Braak (2010) and Scheuer et al. (2010). Such systems do 
not themselves produce arguments but support humans in formulating, structuring 
and evaluating their own arguments or arguments of others. Some supposed ben-
efits of such support systems are that the human user’s thinking can be improved, 
that arguments can be drafted in a better way and be communicated more easily to 
others and that arguments can be connected to textual sources (such as case files) to 
make these sources more transparent. Moreover, computational tools may be used 
to evaluate debates in a more precise way than is possible with unstructured natural-
language arguments. Most argumentation support systems proposed thus far are for 
quite general application domains, such as e-democracy (Wardeh et al. 2013). This 
paper instead studies a quite specific use case of argumentation support: argumenta-
tion about Bayesian analyses of complex criminal cases as attempts to to say some-
thing about the probability of guilt given the available evidence. To obtain insight 
in the requirements for such support system, in particular in the form of argumen-
tation-based add-ons to Bayesian-network software tools, it is important to exam-
ine actual discussions between experts about Bayesian analyses of complex criminal 
cases. Doing so is the purpose of this paper. A side effect may be increased under-
standing of probabilistic reasoning about evidence in criminal cases, which is worth-
while from a theoretical perspective. Note that the relevance of the present study is 
independent of the much debated question whether Bayesian probability theory is 
applicable to legal proof at all. Its relevance is instead given by the fact that Bayes-
ian analyses are as a matter of fact increasingly being presented by forensic experts 
in court, so that discussions about the merits of such analyses inevitably arise, and 
such discussions are essentially argumentative in nature.
The analysis will take the form of a case study of two recent Dutch criminal cases 
in which I was appointed by courts to comment on a Bayesian analysis proposed by 
an expert of the prosecution. In both cases his analysis concerned not just a specific 
aspect of the case but the entire case. This raises the issue to which extent the stud-
ied cases are typical, since Bayesian analyses of entire complex criminal cases are 
still rare in the courtroom. The usual uses of Bayes in the courtroom concern indi-
vidual pieces of evidence, especially random match probabilities of forensic trace 
evidence (DNA, tyre marks, shoe prints, finger prints, glass pieces).
In the present paper I analyse to what extent our expert reports and written replies 
contain arguments that can be classified as instances of argument schemes or as 
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applications of critical questions of these schemes (Sect. 4). I then use this analysis 
to formulate requirements for an implemented support system (Sect. 5). But first I 
present the cases to be studied (Sect. 2) and introduce formal preliminaries concern-
ing probability theory and argumentation (Sect. 3).
2  The cases
In the Breda Six case three young men and three young women were accused of 
jointly having killed a woman in the restaurant of her son in the evening or night 
after closing time, in the year of 1993. The six were initially convicted in two 
instances in 1994 and 1995, mainly on the basis of confessions of the three female 
suspects. The three male suspects have always claimed to be innocent while during 
the appeal case one of the female suspects retracted her confession. In 1998 the case 
was brought to the attention to the Dutch committee for evaluating closed criminal 
cases, because of doubts about the truthfulness of the confessions of the three con-
victed women. This committee referred the case to the Dutch Supreme Court, which 
in 2012 decided to reopen the case. After a new police investigation the six were 
tried again by the court of appeal of The Hague and on 14 October 2015 they were 
again all found guilty, mainly on the ground that new evidence had confirmed the 
reliability of the confessions.
The prosecution (the Advocate General, or AG for short) had on 17 March 2015 
brought in an 80 page expert report written by Dr. Alkemade, containing a Bayesian 
analysis of the entire case. Alkemade (henceforth referred to as A) is an atmospheric 
and climate physicist who until October 2015 worked at SRON, The Netherlands 
Institute for Space Research, based in Utrecht. A claimed that he was able to give 
a Bayesian analysis of the case since he had experience with using Bayesian prob-
ability theory in his work as a physicist. In his report, he concluded that on the basis 
of the evidence considered by him the probability that at least one of the six suspects 
was involved in the crime was 99.7%.
On 28 April 2015 I was appointed as an expert witness in the case by the inves-
tigating judge in the case, with the task to assess and evaluate A’s report. I deliv-
ered my 41 page report on 28 June 2015. In my report I was critical about both A’s 
level of expertise and his method. In its final verdict, the court ruled that A could 
be regarded as an expert for the purpose of the case but that his method cannot 
be regarded as a reliable method for analysing complex criminal cases. The court 
therefore decided to disregard A’s conclusions. These wordings, with “conclusions” 
instead of “report”, suggest that the court may have wanted to give itself the free-
dom to use some elements of A’s report, although its reasoning in the final verdict 
was not expressed in terms of Bayesian probability theory.
In the Oosterland case a person was accused of being responsible for 18 (in appeal 
16) small arson cases in the small town of Oosterland in a six-month period in 2013. In 
the initial case on 13 February 2014 the suspect was acquitted, mainly on the grounds 
that the two main testimonies (of a witness and of another suspect in the same cases) 
were unreliable. In the appeal case the prosecution again brought in a report by A (on 1 
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October 2015), this time 79 pages long. This time A concluded that on the basis of the 
evidence considered by him the probability that the suspect was involved in several of 
the arson cases was at least 99.8%.
On 19 January 2016 I was appointed as an expert witness in the case by the inves-
tigating judge in the appeal case, now with the more specific task to asses the reli-
ability of A’s method and of the way he had applied his method to the case. On 30 
June I delivered my 42 page report, with essentially the same conclusions as in my 
report for in the Breda Six case. A then wrote a reply to my report and I wrote a 
reply to his reply. On 22 November 2016 the court of appeal convicted the suspect 
of 7 arson cases and acquitted him of the remaining 9 cases. Again the court’s rea-
soning was not was not expressed in terms of Bayesian probability theory. The court 
stated without further explanation that it had chosen to disregard A’s report “consid-
ering” my criticism.
3  Formal preliminaries
3.1  Bayesian probability theory
Probability theory (Hacking 2001) defines how probabilities between 0 and 1 (or 
equivalently between 0% and 100%) can be assigned to the truth of statements. As 
for notation, Pr(A) stands for the unconditional probability of A while Pr(A ∣ B) 
stands for the conditional probability of A given B. In criminal cases the court is (on 
a Bayesian account) interested in the conditional probability Pr(H ∣ E) of a hypoth-
esis of interest (for instance, that the suspect is guilty of the charge) given evidence 
E (where E may be a conjunction of individual pieces of evidence). For any state-
ment A, the probabilities of A and ¬A add up to 1. The same holds for Pr(A ∣ C) 
and Pr(¬A ∣ C) for any C. Two pieces of evidence E1 and E2 are said to be statisti-
cally independent given a hypothesis H if learning that E2 is true does not change 
Pr(E1 ∣ H) , i.e., if Pr(E1 ∣ H ∧ E2) = Pr(E1 ∣ H) . The axioms of probability imply 
that such independence is symmetric. The axioms also imply the following theorems 
(here given in odds form). Let E1,… ,En be pieces of evidence and H a hypothesis. 
Then:
This formula is often called the chain rule (in odds form). The fractions on the 
extreme right and left are, respectively, the prior and posterior odds of H and ¬H . 
Given that probabilities of H and ¬H add up to 1, the prior, respectively, posterior 
probability of H can be easily computed from them.
If all of E1,… ,En are statistically independent from each other given H, then the 
chain rule reduces to
Pr(H ∣ E1 ∧… ∧ En)




∣ H ∧ E1 ∧… ∧ En−1)
Pr(E
n
∣ ¬H ∧ E1 ∧… ∧ En−1)
×…
…×
Pr(E2 ∣ H ∧ E1)
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This is the formula used by A in his reports. Its attractiveness is that to determine 
the posterior odds of a hypothesis, it suffices to, respectively, multiply its prior odds 
with the so-called likelihood ratio, or evidential force, of each piece of evidence. 
For each piece of evidence E
i
 all that needs to be specified is how much more or 
less likely E
i
 is given H than given ¬H . If this value exceeds (is less than) 1, then E
i
 
makes H more (less) probable compared to before E
i
 was known, while if the value 
equals 1, the probability of H remains the same, so E
i
 is irrelevant for H.
Elegant as this way of thinking is, it is usually not applicable since often the 
global independence assumption concerning the evidence is not justified. Hence the 
name naive Bayes. Resorting to the general version of the theorem, the chain rule, 
is often also cumbersome, because of the many combinations of pieces of evidence 
that have to be taken into account. As a solution, Bayesian networks (Fenton and 
Neil 2013) have been proposed, which graphically display possible independencies 
with directed links between nodes representing probabilistic variables (e.g. state-
ments that can be true or false). For each value of each node, all that needs to be 
specified is its conditional probability given all combinations of all values of all its 
parents. Evidence can be entered in the network by setting the probability of the 
value of the corresponding node to 1, after which the probabilities of the values of 
the remaining nodes can be updated. For present purposes the most relevant obser-
vation is that to specify a Bayesian network, not only probabilities but also specific 
(in)dependencies have to be asserted.
3.2  Argumentation
Argumentation is the process of evaluating claims by providing and critically exam-
ining grounds for or against the claim. An important notion here is that of argu-
ment schemes (Walton et  al. 2008), which capture typical forms of arguments as 
a scheme with a set of premises and a conclusion, plus a set of critical questions 
that have to be answered before the scheme can be used to derive conclusions. If a 
scheme is deductively valid, that is, if its premises guarantee the conclusion, then all 
critical questions of a scheme ask whether a premise is true. If a scheme is defea-
sibly valid, that is, if its premises create a presumption in favour of its conclusion, 
then the scheme also has critical questions pointing at exceptional circumstances 
under which this presumption is not warranted. One formal approach to argumenta-
tion, ASPIC+ (Modgil and Prakken 2014), formalises argument schemes as (deduc-
tive or defeasible) inference rules and critical questions as pointers to counterargu-
ments: underminers attack an argument’s premise, undercutters state that there is an 
exception to a defeasible rule, and rebuttals have a conclusion that contradicts the 
conclusion of a defeasible inference. Arguments can be formed by chaining infer-
ence rules into directed graphs (which are trees if no premise is used more than 
Pr(H ∣ E1 ∧… ∧ En)
















once). Conflicts between arguments can be resolved with a given relative notion of 
argument strength, to see which arguments defeat each other. Then Dung’s (1995) 
abstract theory of argument evaluation can be used to determine which arguments 
are acceptable.
In the present paper argument schemes and their critical questions will be semi-
formally displayed. Critical questions asking whether the premises of the scheme 
are true will be left implicit. As the formal background ASPIC+ is assumed but the 
analysis will be such that it can also be formalised in similar argumentation formal-
isms or in related formalisms such as Defeasible Logic (Governatori et  al. 2004). 
A formal background can provide a semantics for the notations and it can support 
automatic evaluation of reconstructed discussions. For example, as described by Bex 
et al. (2013), the reconstruction could be stored in the Argument Interchange Format 
format and then be exported to implementations of an argumentation logic, such as 
the online TOAST implementation of ASPIC+ (http://toast .arg-tech.org).
4  The case study
In this section I discuss arguments from the written expert reports, the written 
replies and (when relevant) the verdicts that can be classified as instances of argu-
ment schemes or as applications of critical questions of these schemes. Most of 
the schemes are taken from the literature but in two cases a new scheme will be 
proposed.
All schemes will be presented semiformally in the following format:
Scheme name
Critical questions:
The double horizontal line indicates that the scheme is presumptive. A few times 
deductive schemes will be listed; they will be displayed with a single horizontal line.
4.1  Arguments from expert opinion
When modelling expert testimony, an important scheme is, of course, the scheme of 
arguments from expert opinion. This also holds for Bayesian analyses, since expert 
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judgement is a recognised source of subjective probabilities. So there is every rea-
son to discuss the expertise issue in detail. The scheme below is modelled after Wal-
ton et al. (2008).
Argument scheme from expert opinion
The double horizontal line indicates that the scheme is presumptive. Therefore, 
the scheme has critical questions:
1. How credible is E as an expert source?
2. Is E personally reliable as a source?
3. Is P consistent with what other experts assert?
4. Is E’s assertion of P based on evidence?
Question (1) is about the level of expertise while question (2) is about personal bias. 
With respect to question (3) an implicit condition of use becomes relevant, namely, 
that the expert opinion scheme can only be used by those who are not themselves 
experts in domain D, such as the judges in the cases. I could, of course, not defeat 
A’s arguments by saying that I am also an expert and I say ¬P.
In probability theory sometimes a sharp distinction is made between frequentist 
(objective) and epistemic (subjective) Bayesian probability theory. Probabilities 
based on frequencies as reported by statistics would be objectively justified, while 
probabilities reflecting a person’s degrees of belief would be just subjective. How-
ever, selecting, interpreting and applying statistics involves judgement, which could 
be subjective. Moreover, a person’s degrees of belief could be more than just subjec-
tive if they are about a subject matter in which s/he is an expert. The same actually 
holds for the judgements involved in applying frequency information and statistics: 
if these judgements are made by someone who is an expert in the problem at hand, 
these judgements may again be more than purely subjective. So the issue of exper-
tise is crucial in both ‘objective’ (frequentist) and ‘subjective’ (epistemic) Bayes 
(likewise Biedermann et al. (2017)).
It should be noted that in many cases, an expert asserts not a proposition but an 
argument. In this section I confine myself to assertions of statements; in Sect. 4.2 I 
will discuss how expert assertions of arguments can be modelled as sequences of 
assertions of statements.
4.1.1  The truth of the premises
Before the witness testimony scheme can be applied, first its premises have to be 
established. In the two cases, the question whether the first premise is true was very 
relevant. In this respect the cases highlight the importance of a distinction: P can 
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be a specific statement made by the expert about a specific piece of evidence but it 
can also be a collection of similar statements or even the entire expert report. What 
A did was formulating hypotheses, making decisions about relevance of evidence to 
these hypotheses, about statistical independence between pieces of evidence given 
these hypotheses and, finally, about probability judgements. I claimed that all these 
decisions can only be reliably made by someone who is an expert in the domains 
of the various aspects of the case at hand. In the Breda Six this concerned, among 
other things, the time of rigor mortis, reliability of statements by the suspects and 
witnesses (including hearsay evidence and anonymous witnesses), information 
concerning prior convictions and prior criminal investigations, evidence of various 
traces like DNA, blood stains and hairs, statistical evidence concerning confession 
rates among various ethnic groups and various common-sense issues, such as the 
relevance of the fact that two of the six suspects worked in a snack-bar next door to 
the crime scene. In the Oosterland case the main evidence concerned statements of 
the suspects and witnesses, statistics and other general knowledge about arson cases, 
information concerning prior convictions and prior criminal investigations and again 
various commonsense issues, such as how communities might turn against individu-
als and the relevance of friendships between suspects.
Let us now consider the case where D is the domain of Bayesian analysis of com-
plex criminal cases, understood as comprising all the above issues. In my report, I 
formulated two general arguments against the truth of the first premise that A is an 
expert in this domain. First, expertise in the mathematics of Bayesian probability 
theory does not imply expertise in applying Bayes to a domain and, second, exper-
tise in applying Bayesian probability theory in the domain of climate physics does 
not imply expertise in applying Bayes to the domain of complex criminal cases.
In his requisitory (pp. 184–185), the advocate general in the Breda Six case 
argued that A is an expert in Bayesian reasoning by mentioning that A had given 
tutorials about this topic to judges and prosecutors at the Dutch national training 
center for the judiciary (SSR) and that he had given various guest lectures on this 
topic at Dutch universities. In my report in the Oosterland case (one year after the 
Breda Six case) I anticipated similar arguments by stating that such activities do not 
make someone an expert but that rather one is invited to give tutorials and guest lec-
tures because one is regarded to be an expert on the basis of other evidence, and this 
other evidence was, in my opinion, lacking.
The AG in the Breda Six case did not give arguments for A’s expertise on any of 
the evidence domains in the case, while yet he used A’s analyses of blood stain evi-
dence, hair evidence and rigor mortis issues in quite some detail.
The court in the Breda Six case ruled that A could be regarded as an expert on the 
following grounds. First the court stated the relevant criteria: profession, education 
and experience of the claimed expert, the relevance of his expertise for the case, the 
nature of the method used by the claimed expert, whether this method is reliable and 
whether the claimed expert is able to apply this method skillfully. The court then 
referred to A’s education and PhD in physics and remarked that he had experience 
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in the application of Bayesian thinking, “albeit in fields of science and research dif-
ferent than the law”.2 The court then mentioned the SSR tutorials also mentioned by 
the advocate general in his requisitory, and mentioned that A had advised the pros-
ecution in one earlier case, “although not as an appointed expert”. Finally, the court 
noted that A had in his report and in the court session described his method and his 
way of applying it in quite some detail, and had argued why he thought this method 
was reliable.
In my opinion, this argument can be criticised in many ways. First, it is remark-
able that the court did not explicitly apply its own criterion whether A’s expertise 
was relevant to the case. The court did in its conclusion not even state in which field 
A could be regarded as an expert; it just stated that he could be regarded as an expert 
“for the present procedure”. As noted above, I had in my report argued that expertise 
in Bayesian thinking and its application in one domain does not imply expertise in 
the application of Bayesian thinking in another domain. Just like the advocate gen-
eral, the court chose not to reply to this argument.
Second, as I noted above in my comments on the AG’s requisitory, the relevance 
of A’s SSR tutorials for his expertise can be questioned. In fact, the courts mention-
ing of A’s work as an advisor for the prosecution in an earlier case is subject to the 
same criticism. Third, there is no evidence for the court’s claim that A had experi-
ence in Bayesian analysis in his work as a climate physicist. In fact, some evidence 
suggests that the opposite may be the case. For my report in the Oosterland case I 
did a search with Google scholar and I could find no publications of A on climate 
physics.
Fourth, the court did not apply its own criteria concerning the method used by A. 
All the court did was mentioning that A described his method and way of using it 
and that A had argued why the method is reliable. From this nothing follows about 
whether the method is indeed reliable and whether A is indeed able to apply it. To 
be honest, the court did address the question whether A’s method is reliable, but not 
as an aspect of the expertise question. I will discuss this part of the court’s ruling 
below in Sect. 4.3.
In Fig.  1 this analysis is visualised, with as top-level conclusion that A is an 
expert in Bayesian analysis of complex criminal cases (the first premise of the wit-
ness testimony scheme). In the figure, final conclusions of arguments are displayed 
in thick boxes. When the way in which several grounds for the same conclusion are 
combined is unclear, this is visualised with separate single arrows pointing to the 
same conclusion. Thus further interpretation about whether the premises are linked 
or accrue is left to the reader. Next, specific generalisations are left implicit and 
attacks on them are visualised as attacks on the inference. Note that in an imple-
mented support system it might instead be useful to visualise generalisations as 
premises, to support arguments about whether they are justified.
In the Oosterland case, court did not discuss the issue of A’s expertise but the 
issue was discussed by A in his written reply to my report. He admitted that he has 
no expertise in any of the relevant evidence domains of the case and he argued that 
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the value of his report did not lie in providing reliable posterior probabilities but 
in showing which questions had to be answered by the court. To understand this, 
it is relevant that A’s analyses in the two cases were applications of naive Bayes, 
with specifications of the prior odds concerning the hypotheses and the likelihood 
ratio’s of each individual piece of evidence given these hypotheses. A presented this 
as a “spreadsheet” approach, suitable for showing to the court which probability 
judgements they had to make, after which all these probabilities could be multiplied 
according to Bayes’ rule to provide the posterior odds. My first argument against 
this (to be discussed further below in Sect. 4.3) was that naive Bayes is too simplis-
tic to be applicable to complex criminal cases, so that the spreadsheet metaphor is 
misleading. My second counterargument was that even identifying the right ques-
tions in a complex criminal requires expertise in the relevant evidence domains. In 
my report in the Oosterland case I backed this with a medical analogy, further dis-
cussed below in Sect. 4.4.
This completes the discussion of the first premise of the witness testimony 
scheme. The second premise was not really an issue in the case, while the third 
premise is irrelevant given the way the discussion about the first premise was sum-
marised above.
4.1.2  The critical questions
Considering the critical questions of the scheme, personal bias (the second question) 
was not considered as an issue in the cases. The first question (how credible is E as 
an expert source) is in fact a weaker version of the question whether the first premise 
(is E an expert in domain D?) is true: if the court in the Breda Six is followed in its 
decision that A can be regarded as an expert for the purpose of the case, then the 
arguments against this decision now become arguments that A’s level of expertise 
is low. Such arguments are especially relevant when dealing with the third critical 
question (Is P consistent with what other experts assert?). In fact, A and I disagreed 
on a number of issues, so the court arguably had to assess the relative level of our 
respective expertise, and doing so is a kind of metalevel argumentation about the 
strength of arguments as formalised by e.g. Modgil and Prakken (2010). Finally, the 
fourth question (Is E’s assertion of P based on evidence?) was used by me in form-
ing arguments that most of A’s probability judgements were not based on any data 
or scientific knowledge and in an argument against A’s specific assertion, not backed 
by any reference, that “internationally accepted estimates” yield a specific likelihood 
ratio of confessions.
4.1.3  Conclusions on expertise arguments
Concluding, Walton et al’s (2008) argument scheme from expert opinion is a good 
overall framework for analysing the debates about expertise in the two cases. On the 
other hand, most interesting argumentation is not at the top level of this scheme but 
deeper down in the detailed arguments concerning the scheme’s premises and criti-
cal questions. A support system should therefore not confine itself to giving support 
at the top level of an argument scheme. If more specific knowledge is available (as, 
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for instance, in the criteria for assessing expertise that a legal system may have), 
then this should preferably be incorporated. As for the arguments in Fig. 1, some of 
them are quite specific to the case but others are more generic, such the arguments 
on whether expertise in Bayes implies expertise in applying Bayes and the argu-
ments on whether expertise in applying Bayes in one domain implies expertise in 
applying it in another domain. In the present cases (with A being a climate physicist 
and having no relevant education, work experience or publications) the counterargu-
ments are quite strong but other cases could arise in which, for example, statisticians 
or philosophers of science give Bayesian analyses. In such cases Fig.  1 points at 
relevant issues to be discussed.
Finally, it should be noted that the significance of this section is not confined to 
Bayesian expert analysis. Many observations from this sections also apply to expert 
analyses with other reasoning approaches, such as argumentation or story-based 
approaches. Here too, expertise in a mode of reasoning must be combined with 
expertise on the matters at hand.
4.2  Arguments from reasoning errors
In Sect. 4.1 I assumed that an expert asserts propositions but often an expert will 
assert an argument. Asserting an argument includes but goes beyond asserting 
its premises and conclusion: the expert also claims that the conclusion has to be 
accepted because of the premises. In many cases such an argument can be attacked 
by rebutting, undercutting or undermining it. However, sometimes a critic might 
want to say that the argument is inherently fallacious. This is not the same as stating 
an undercutting argument, since an undercutter merely claims that there is an excep-
tion to an otherwise acceptable inference rule. Although any expert may make rea-
soning errors, such errors will especially in the present domain, with many complex 
probabilistic arguments and sometimes complex statistical arguments, be frequent. 
So arguments from reasoning errors deserve to be studied in this paper.
In the two cases of the present case study, several arguments about argument 
validity were exchanged. An example from the Breda Six case is when I claimed 
that contrary to what A claimed, a probability concluded by A does not follow in 
probability theory from other probabilities assumed by A. After some discussion I 
had to admit that I was wrong and that A’s argument was deductively valid.
In his report in the Oosterland case, A first estimated the probability of fifteen 
arson cases in a town like Oosterland in a six-months period given the hypothesis 
that they were not related as at most one in a million. He then concluded from this 
that the fifteen arson cases that he considered in his report cannot have been coin-
cidence and that they must have been related. More formally, this argument can be 
rendered as ‘The probability that the fifteen incidents happen given that they are 
unrelated is at most 1 in a million, therefore the probability that the fifteen incidents 
are unrelated given that they happen is very low’. From this he in turn concluded 
that serial arsonists must have been active, since no other relation would be realisti-
cally possible. In my report I claimed that this argument is an instance of the prose-
cutor fallacy, since it confuses the probability that the fifteen incidents happen given 
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that they are not related with the probability that the fifteen incidents are not related 
given that they happen (this is sometimes also called the fallacy of the transposed 
conditional). A full argument would not just state but show that given the axioms of 
probability theory the second probability is not implied by the first. However, I left 
this part of my argument implicit since I assumed it to be generally known.
One way to show that A’s argument is fallacious is by giving a sim-
ple formal counterexample, for example, to specify for some E and H that 
Pr(E ∣ H) = Pr(E ∣ ¬H) = 1∕1.000.000 so that the likelihood ratio of E with respect 
to H equals 1, so that the posterior probability Pr(H ∣ E) equals the prior probability 
Pr(H), which can be any value. As a reply, it might be argued that in the present case 
Pr(E ∣ ¬H) (i.e. the probability of the 15 incidents given that they are related) is much 
higher than 1 / 1.000.000 and that, moreover, the prior is such that an application of 
Bayes’ rule would yield a very low posterior Pr(H ∣ E) . However, this would not rein-
state the fallacious argument but instead replace it with a valid argument.
From the point of view of argument visualisation one would like to have the follow-
ing. For a given probabilistic statement 휑 , such as a link or probability in a Bayesian 
network, or a probability that is part of a likelihood ratio specified by an expert, the user 
could click on the statement and be able to inspect the following argument:
Expert E asserts that 휓1,… ,휓n
Expert E asserts that 휓1,… ,휓n imply 휑
Therefore, 휑 because of 휓1,… ,휓n.
Discussions about reasoning errors by experts can then schematically be represented 
as follows with several applications of the witness testimony scheme combined with an 
inference from their conclusions: 
Then if the fact finder both accepts 휓1,… ,휓n and that 휓1,… ,휓n imply 휑 on the 
basis of the expert testimony, the fact finder should also accept 휑.
This approach can be used to model any debate about reasoning errors by experts. I 
now illustrate it with a probabilistic example from the present case studies, namely, the 
dispute in the Oosterland case about my claim that A had committed the prosecutor fal-
lacy. In terms of the just-sketched approach, this dispute was about the final application 
of this sequence of expert testimony schemes and can be modelled as follows.
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Here P is the conclusion of the first argument and >> means ‘much 
greater than’. The conclusions of these two arguments deductively imply 
Pr(related ∣ incidents) >> 0.5.
My counterargument can be modelled as follows, where C stands for a descrip-
tion of the above-given counterexample: 
In ASPIC+ and similar argumentation systems this argument defeats the preced-
ing one, since it is a deductive argument with universally true premises while its 
target is defeasible.
4.3  Methodological issues
The reliability of the method used by A was an issue in both cases. One might expect 
that this issue will frequently arise in debates between experts, so a discussion is in 
order, even though the arguments in the two cases did not clearly instantiate recog-
nised argument schemes. Neither courts defined what they meant with reliability. I 
defined it as the question whether different analysts applying the same method to the 
same problem will arrive at the same or at least similar result. In both my reports 
I argued that Bayesian analysis is not a reliable method in this sense, since in the 
academic literature there is no consensus on the right way of using Bayes for analys-
ing complex criminal cases. In fact, there seems to be consensus on two things: that 
naive Bayes is too simplistic for complex criminal cases and that further research 
is needed before reliable methods can be offered to courts. Much current research 
concentrates on applying Bayesian networks (Fenton and Neil 2011; Lagnado et al. 
2013; Vlek et  al. 2016; de  Zoete et  al. 2015) but the results are still preliminary 
while, moreover, it is almost exclusively concerned with the structure of Bayesian 
networks and leaves aside the question how reliable probabilities can be established. 
For these reasons, it seems quite likely that different analysts will produce quite dif-
ferent Bayesian analyses of the same case. This warrants the conclusion that A’s 
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method is therefore not reliable in the sense defined above. This conclusion gener-
alises to any use of Bayesian probability theory to analyse complex criminal cases.
In neither of the two cases did A respond to this criticism. The court in the Six 
of Breda case agreed with my analysis and therefore disregarded the conclusions of 
A’s report. The court in the Oosterland case did not comment on this issue except for 
summarising my argument. Since the court chose to disregard A’s report “consider-
ing” my criticisms, this indicates that they may have agreed with my argument.
Like with the scheme from expert testimony, methodological issues can concern 
either the entire report or specific issues. An example of the latter was the debates in 
both cases between A and me about the appropriateness of the global independence 
assumption implied by A’s adoption of naive Bayes. For example, in both cases A 
used quite specific pieces of evidence to assess the prior probabilities of his hypoth-
eses. The axioms of probability theory then imply that in every likelihood ratio the 
evidence has to be conditioned not just on the hypotheses but also on the evidence 
used for assess their priors, unless the pieces of evidence can be regarded as statisti-
cally independent given these hypotheses. A did not condition the likelihood ratios 
in this way but neither provided arguments for the required independence assump-
tions. I criticised him on the grounds that according to the axioms of probability 
theory he should have done either one or the other of these things. This is general 
methodological criticism that translates into specific criticism of A’s final argument 
that the posterior odds can be calculated by multiplying his prior odds and likeli-
hood ratios. There are two ways to formally model this specific criticism. One is 
to interpret A’s final argument as having as additional premises the required inde-
pendence assumptions and then to observe that these additional assumptions are not 
backed by evidence or argument. The other way is to leave these assumptions out of 
the interpreted argument and then to build an argument in the style of Sect. 4.2 that 
A’s final argument is deductively invalid.
4.4  Analogical arguments
In the two case studies, several analogical arguments were used. The following ver-
sion of the scheme for such arguments is fairly standard; cf. (Walton et al. 2008, pp. 
58,315).
Argument scheme from analogy
Critical questions:
1. Do cases C1 and C2 also have relevant differences ?
2. Is Case C2 relevantly similar to some other case C3 in which P is false?
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As is well-known, for special domains the scheme can be concretised, such as for 
case-based reasoning in the law (Bench-Capon 2017). However, for present pur-
poses the above version will do.
One use of analogy was in the Breda Six case, concerning the evidence that 
two of the three accused women worked in a snack-bar next door to the crime 
scene. In his report, A specified a likelihood ratio of the “coincidence” between 
this piece of evidence and other evidence that these two suspects knew three other 
suspects who by an anonymous informant of the criminal intelligence unit of the 
police (CID) had been mentioned as being involved in the crime. A first specified 
the denominator of this likelihood ratio (the probability of the coincidence given 
innocence of all six accused) as 1 in 500 to 1 in 1000 (on grounds that are irrel-
evant here). He then said “this agrees with a likelihood ratio of the coincidence 
of 500 to 1000”. Taking this literally, this is a simple error, since before this con-
clusion can be drawn, first the probability of the coincidence given A’s offender 
hypothesis has to be determined. However, other parts of A’s report reveal that 
he set this probability to 1. Here he used an analogy with a hypothetical case in 
which a burglar breaks into a house by using a key of the house. Suppose a sus-
pect is caught in possession of the key. According to A, possession of the key is 
a necessary element of the crime, so given that of the suspect committed the bur-
glary, the probability that he possesses the key is 1. In the same way, A argued, 
the coincidence in the Breda Six case is a necessary element in the crime, since 
A’s offender hypothesis was that at least some of the six accused were involved 
in the crime, where one or more female accused lured the victim to the restau-
rant where the crime took place. I criticised this on the grounds that, firstly, such 
luring can also be done by someone who does not work next door to the restau-
rant, such as the third female suspect; and, second, that the joint innocence of the 
two female suspects working next door to the restaurant is consistent with A’s 
offender hypothesis. So the coincidence cannot be regarded as a necessary ele-
ment of the crime. In pointing this out, I observed that this is a relevant difference 
with A’s hypothetical burglary case, in which possession of the key is a necessary 
element of the crime. Thus I criticised A’s analogy by using the first critical ques-
tion of the analogy scheme.
Arguably another use of analogy in the Breda Six case is in the reasoning why 
A can be regarded as an expert in Bayesian analysis of complex criminal cases 
(Sect. 4.1 above). A reasoning step that is arguably implicit in the court’s ruling on 
this issue is that experts in Bayesian analysis in physics are also experts in Bayesian 
analysis of complex criminal cases. This argument can be seen as an argument from 
analogy, referring to the supposed similarity between Bayesian analysis of problems 
in physics and of complex criminal cases. My argument that the one does not imply 
the other can be regarded as another application of the first critical question of the 
analogy scheme. One might expect that in debates about the use of Bayes by experts 
in court such analogical arguments referring to expertise in supposedly similar fields 
will arise more often.
In fact, the same holds for arguments used in combination with arguments from 
statistics, such as the arguments discussed above that statistics on arson in Japan 
and the UK also apply to the Netherlands. These arguments, too, can be seen as 
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analogical arguments so they, too, can be criticised with the critical questions of the 
analogy scheme.
Finally, in my reply to A’s reply in the Oosterland case I made use of a medical 
hypothetical to criticise A’s claim that he is able to show the court which questions 
it has to consider. My hypothetical was part of a rhetorical question whether a medi-
cal specialist investigating a seriously ill patient would ask a climate physicist to tell 
him which medical investigations he had to perform.
4.5  Arguments from statistics
One might expect that in a probabilistic analysis of a complex criminal case, argu-
ments from statistics to individual probability statements are frequent. Yet in my two 
cases most probability judgements were not based on statistics; in just a few cases A 
used them to support his judgements. In some other cases A used a quasi-frequentist 
approach. For example, in the Oosterland case he assessed the probability that the 
suspect and someone else (a suspect in a related case) were best friends given the 
innocence hypothesis by first observing that Oosterland has 2400 inhabitants and 
then supposing that for men like the suspect there were 200 candidates in Oosterland 
for being his best friend, thus arriving at a probability of 1 in 200 given innocence of 
both. This illustrates that even if probability judgements are based on data, the step 
from data to probabilities can involve subjective assumptions (in this case that there 
were 200 candidates for being the suspect’s best friend).
In its most basic form, an argument from a statistical frequency to an individual 
probability takes the following form.
Argument scheme from statistical frequencies
It is important to note that this scheme is presumptive: there is no necessary rela-
tion between a frequency statement about a class and a conditional probability state-
ment about a member of that class. So the scheme has critical questions other than 
whether the premises are true. Hacking (2001) calls the scheme the ‘frequency prin-
ciple’. He notes that it is justified on the assumption that nothing else relevant is 
known besides the frequency and that a is an F; he also notes that a lot of judgement 
can go into the question which other information can be relevant.
Before considering the scheme’s critical questions, let us look at how the first 
premise can be established. One way is by statistical induction:
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This scheme is not treated in the usual accounts of argument schemes, such as 
Walton et al. (2008). A full investigation of ways to criticise uses of the scheme 
would lead us to the field of statistics, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
For now it suffices to list two obvious critical questions: whether the sample of 
investigated F’s is biased and whether it is large enough.
In my cases, A derived some statistical information from sources. For exam-
ple, in the Breda Six case he used statistics reported in a criminological publica-
tion on the frequencies of confessions of denials among various ethnic groups in 
the Netherlands. The reasoning then becomes:
E says that S is a relevant statistic, E is expert on this, therefore (presum-
ably), S is a relevant statistic. Furthermore, S says that the proportion of 
investigated F’s that were G’s is n  / m, therefore (presumably) the propor-
tion of investigated F’s that were G’s is n / m.
The final conclusion then feeds into the scheme from statistical frequencies. In 
my report on the Breda Six case, I did not criticise A’s specific selection of statis-
tics on confessions and denials but I did note in general that selection of relevant 
and reliable statistics from the research literature requires expertise in the sub-
ject matter of that literature. I then observed that there was no evidence that A 
possessed criminological expertise of the relevant kind, thus in fact attacking the 
second premise of this line of reasoning. All this illustrates that even in reasoning 
from statistics the argument scheme from expert opinion is relevant.
I now turn to three possible critical questions of the scheme from statistical 
frequencies (there may be more).
1. Is there conflicting frequency information about more specific classes? This is 
the well-known issue of choosing the most specific reference class.
2. Is there conflicting frequency information about overlapping classes? This is a 
variant of the issue of choosing the most specific reference class. If a belongs to 
two non-overlapping but non-inclusive classes F and H, then in general the pro-
portion of F-and-H’s that are G does not depend on the respective proportions of 
F’s and H’s that are G. So without further information nothing can be concluded 
on Pr(Ga ∣ Fa ∧ Ha).
3. Are there other reasons not to apply the frequency? For example, a might belong 
to some subclass for which commonsense or expert judgement yields different fre-
quency assessments. For instance, in the Oosterland case, the probability assumed 
by A that the suspect and the other person were best friends given the innocence 
hypothesis ignored that both were outsiders in the community, that they had simi-
lar life styles and that one was previously convicted and the other was previously 
suspected of serial arson. Even if no statistics about these subclasses of adult male 
inhabitants of Oosterland exist, commonsense says that given these characteristics 
the probability of being best friends given innocence may be considerably higher 
than as assumed by A in his quasi-frequentist way.
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Another scheme that was used by A in deriving probability judgements from statis-
tics was the scheme from analogy (cf. Sect. 4.4). For example, in his report in the 
Oosterland case, he based his assessment of the probability of fifteen arson cases in 
a town like Oosterland in a half-year period given that no serial arsonist was active 
in Oosterland in that period among other things on statistics on arson in Japan and 
the United Kingdom. Applying this statistic to The Netherlands assumes that Japan 
and the United Kingdom are relevantly similar to the Netherlands as regards (serial) 
arson. This seems a quite common way of using statistics for deriving probability 
judgements. Here again the expertise issue comes up, since judging whether two 
countries are relevantly similar as regards (serial) arson requires domain expertise 
relevant to that question. Here too my general criticism was that there was no evi-
dence that A, being a climate physicist, possesses such relevant expertise.
Summarising, reasoning from statistics can be a combination of at least the fol-
lowing presumptive argument schemes: arguments from statistical frequencies, 
arguments from statistical induction, arguments from expert opinion and arguments 
from analogy. In addition, specific methodological concerns from the field of statis-
tics can arise. Therefore, a full model of evaluating arguments from statistics cannot 
be developed without involving statisticians.
Finally, the analysis in this section is also relevant for argumentative and story-
based reasoning approaches. In both these approaches qualitative defeasible gener-
alisations are very important. For example, in argumentative approaches evidential 
generalisations connect evidence to conclusions, such as witnesses usually speak 
the truth. And in story-based approaches causal generalisations connect hypotheses 
to evidence, such as extreme jealousy can cause feelings of murderous revenge. A 
qualitative version of the statistical induction scheme could be used to argue for such 
generalisations. For example:
Moreover, the critical questions of the scheme from statistical frequencies have 
their counterparts in critical examinations of arguments applying defeasible gen-
eralisations. The first two questions indicate the possibility of rebutting arguments 
(arguments for contradictary conclusions) on the basis of conflicting generalisations 
while the third question points at undercutting on uses of the qualitative variant of 
the statistical induction scheme.
5  Requirements for an argumentation support system
By way of summary I now list the requirements for a support system for argumenta-
tion about Bayesian analyses of criminal cases suggested by the present case study.
First, the system should provide support for use of the common argument schemes 
in this domain, including the schemes discussed in this paper. In addition, support 
should be provided for formulating and criticising arguments not conforming to 
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such schemes. One way to provide such support is to utilise legal knowledge, regu-
lations or policies about evaluating specific types of evidence, such as the criteria 
that several jurisdictions have for determining whether someone can be regarded as 
an expert witness. Parts of the present case study may also be reusable, such as the 
analysis of expertise arguments visualised in Fig. 1. In addition, collaboration with 
statisticians may result in useful refinements of the critical questions of the scheme 
from statistics.
Capturing ownership of arguments and claims is important, especially with 
respect to evaluating the expertise of the owner or assessing the relative strength of 
conflicting arguments of different experts. For the latter, the system should also sup-
port metalevel argumentation about argument strength.
The system should also support arguments about the (deductive or defeasible) 
validity of other arguments. For this reason, the system should support explicit rep-
resentation of the logical nature of an argument and it should not prevent the formu-
lation of arguments that are neither deductively nor defeasibly valid. Note that a sys-
tem like Carneades (Gordon et al. 2007) which abstracts from the relation between 
premises and conclusion, does not fully satisfy these requirements.
The system should somehow make a natural distinction between discussions 
about general issues or expertise and methodology and discussions about expertise 
and method concerning specific expert assertions. On the one hand, it would be nice 
if a user of a tool for designing Bayesian networks could simply click on any ele-
ment of a network to inspect the arguments exchanged about that element. However, 
this might not cover all relevant arguments, since as we have seen, many arguments 
are about more general issues.
Finally, there should be ways to express that no evidence for a claim or premise 
has been provided, since that is a usual way of criticising arguments in general and 
expert arguments in particular. If the software provides automatic means for evaluat-
ing a debate, then this issue should be taken into account, as is, for instance, done in 
Carneades.
6  Related research
One motivation underlying the present paper was the design of support software for 
modelling discussions about Bayesian analyses of complex criminal cases. In the 
medical domain, Yet et al. (2016) have recently presented a similar system, which 
relates a medical BN to the clinical evidence on which it is based. Both supporting 
and conflicting evidence of a BN element can be represented in and shown by the 
system, as well as evidence related to excluded variables or relations. Three sources 
of evidence are modelled: publications, experts and data. Despite its argumentative 
flavour, the system is not based on an explicit argumentation model.
There is some earlier research on argumentation related to Bayesian analyses of 
criminal cases. Bex and Renooij (2016) provide a translation from ASPIC+-style 
arguments to constraints on Bayesian networks (BN). Their focus is different from 
the present paper in that their arguments are not about how to justify elements of 
BN. Instead, the translation method aims to translate the information expressed in an 
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argument in the BN. For example, one constraint says that propositions in arguments 
should have corresponding nodes in the BN and another constraint says that infer-
ences in an argument and attacks between arguments should have a corresponding 
‘active’ chain of links in the BN.
Timmer et al. (2017) does the opposite as Bex and Renooij (2016), namely, trans-
lating the information contained in a BN into an ASPIC+ argumentation framework, 
in order to explain the BN with arguments.
The closest to the present paper is Keppens (2014), who proposes a set of source-
based argument schemes for modelling the provenance of probability judgements in 
likelihood approaches. Among other things, Keppens proposes schemes for expert 
opinion (a special case of the one in the present paper), for reasoning from data 
sets (not unlike the present scheme for reasoning from statistics) and for reasoning 
from generally accepted theories. In addition, Keppens proposes a set of schemes 
for relating source-based claims concerning the nature of subjective probability dis-
tributions (such as ‘B has a [non-negative/non-positive] effect on the likelihood of 
C’) to formal constraints on the probability distributions. Yet there is a difference 
in approach. Keppens primarily aims to build a formal and computational model, 
while this paper primarily aims to analyse how discussions about Bayesian analyses 
actually take place. Thus the present study complements Keppens’ research. Also, 
the focus of Keppens’ model is more limited than the present study in that it only 
models arguments about specific probability distributions.
7  Conclusion
In this paper a new use case for legal argumentation support tools has been consid-
ered: supporting discussions about Bayesian analyses of complex criminal cases. By 
way of a case study, two actual discussions between experts in court cases have been 
analysed on their argumentation structure. Since this is a case study, the question 
arises how general the results are. As stated in the introduction, it is hard to say to 
which extent the studied cases are typical, since Bayesian analyses of entire complex 
criminal cases are still rare in the courtroom. The usual uses of Bayes in the court-
room concern individual pieces of evidence, especially random match probabilities 
of forensic trace evidence (DNA, tyre marks, shoe prints, finger prints, glass pieces). 
Also, since I was involved in the debate about the Bayesian analysis, my analysis in 
the present paper may have been affected by a personal view.
Nevertheless, with this in mind, the case study still warrants some preliminary 
conclusions. From a theoretical point of view the richness of argumentation about 
Bayesian analyses and the usefulness of several recognised argument schemes have 
been confirmed, a new argument scheme for arguments from statistics has been 
formulated, and a novel analysis of some subtleties concerning arguments from 
expert opinion has been given. In particular, the rich variety of argument schemes 
that turned out to be applicable in our case studies suggests that rational discus-
sions about Bayesian analyses of complex criminal cases need not conform to strict 
statistical or forensic-science methodology but may employ many techniques from 
argumentation theory. From a practical point of view the case study has resulted in 
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requirements for support software for discussions about Bayesian analyses of com-
plex criminal cases. The actual design and usefulness of such software are issues 
for future research, as well as the refinement of critical questions of some argument 
schemes, in particular the schemes for arguments from expert opinion and from sta-
tistics. Moreover, some contributions of this paper may also be relevant for other 
domains in which Bayesian analysis is used, such as medicine.
Finally, at several places in this paper we saw that the significance of the pre-
sent analysis is not confined to Bayesian approaches but extends to discussions 
about expert reports using any reasoning method. To briefly summarise, expertise 
in any mode of reasoning must be combined with expertise on the matters at hand 
(Sect. 4.1) and arguments from statistics can in qualitative forms be found in argu-
ments about defeasible generalisations in argumentative or scenario-based analysis 
(Sect. 4.5). And presumably, analogical arguments can be made about any kind of 
analysis (Sect. 4.4).
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